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RESOLVING THE TENSION:
ARBITRATION CONFRONTS THE
EXTERNAL LEGAL SYSTEM
Sylvester Garrett*
ONE STATED THEME of this Symposium is that the charac-
ter of modern grievance arbitration was derived from theory,
practice, and procedure put into place by the National War Labor
Board (NWLB). The narrower topic assigned to me is "Resolving
the Tension: Arbitration Confronts the External Legal System."
This evening I would like to address both of these topics from an
historical perspective by recollecting some of my experiences and
impressions.
Regarding the notion that modern arbitration was derived
from NWLB directives, allow me to stress that it is wrong to as-
sume that grievance arbitration was virtually unknown prior to
World War II and that it was essentially created by the NWLB.
In fact, a number of industries already followed such a procedure.
A Board of Conciliation and Arbitration had existed in the an-
thracite coal industry since about 1910. Long before the War, Im-
partial Chairmen functioned in the needle and printing trades, the
full fashioned hosiery industry, the textile industry, and the mass
transit industry. The Railroad Adjustment Board system was es-
tablished in 1934. By 1938, General Motors had established its
umpire system in agreement with the United Auto Workers
(UAW). Arbitration was also firmly in place in the West Coast
Shipping Industry.
As of December 7, 1941, George Taylor, Harry Millis, John
Lapp, William Leiserson, Wayne Morse, and Jacob Billikopf were
already well-recognized giants in the field of arbitration. William
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writer acknowledges with deep gratitude the major contribution of his Associate, Arbitra-
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Simkin, Allen Dash, and David Cole had already launched what
were to become illustrious careers. It is also my impression that by
this time both the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and
the United States Conciliation Service maintained rosters of labor
arbitrators.
Clearly, the NWLB did not create grievance arbitration - it
simply adopted and nurtured an established institution. The
United States Supreme Court decisions in Lincoln Mills,' the
Steelworkers Trilogy,' Boys Market,3 and many other cases, in-
cluding the relatively recent Misco decision,4 have also enhanced
the status of grievance arbitration. The National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) decisions in Spielberg,3 Collyer,6 Olin,7 and their
progeny have also had this effect. For my purposes, therefore, one
significant and basic question for us this evening is: Why did the
NWLB, and ultimately the courts and the NLRB, seek so vigor-
ously to promote grievance arbitration?
With respect to external law, a cogent second question is:
Once an arbitration award has been issued, how much deference
should a reviewing court give to it? This question involves a major
aspect of the tension which puportedly exists between arbitration
and the external law. Let me confess at the outset that I believe
that this relationship generally is not confrontational. External
law, in balance, tends to support and advance grievance arbitra-
tion. One potentially significant area of confrontation, however,
involves the scope of judicial review. It is well beyond my present
capacity, at least in terms of available time, to critique all of the
judicial and NLRB rulings which address this question and pro-
vide such a rich field for scholarly review. My more modest hope
is to consider a few significant cases and to recall some historical
background which may be useful in evaluating the proper scope of
judicial review from a practical, rather than a theoretical,
perspective.
Returning to the question of why the NWLB, the courts, and
1. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
2. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
3. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
4. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
5. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
6. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
7. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
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the NLRB sought to promote arbitration, it is my impression that
an evolutionary process was at work. Let me reach back to the
Fall of 1939 and my first personal exposure to this developing sys-
tem. On June 1, 1939, William ("Billy") Leiserson became one of
the three members of the NLRB, replacing Donald Wakefield
Smith. At the time of his selection, Billy was serving with great
distinction as Chairman of the National Mediation Board
(NMB), and presumably could have stayed there indefinitely.
Many of us who were young attorneys at the NLRB in 1939 spec-
ulated as to why Leiserson left his comfortable NMB niche to
move onto the NLRB battlefield, where a major part of the bitter
war between the American Federation of Labor (AFL) and the
Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) was being fought.
One major front in this on-going AFL-CIO war involved the
NLRB's determination of what were "appropriate units" for pur-
poses of union certification as collective bargaining representa-
tives. The AFL was convinced that the only appropriate NLRB
determination would be one which found that craft units were the
appropriate collective bargaining unit. The CIO was equally cer-
tain that only a plant-wide "industrial" unit would be appropriate.
This dramatic confrontation was totally unexpected when the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) was adopted by Congress
in 1935. This issue presented the NLRB with its most vexing
problems during the years before World War II. I am sure that
Warren Madden had no inkling of what lay ahead when he left
the Deanship of the Pittsburgh Law School to become the first
NLRB Chairman. When Madden finally had to grapple with this
explosive issue, he received very little help from his colleagues,
one of whom was a left wing idealist and the other an intellectual
lightweight. Ultimately, Madden settled on the so-called Globe
Doctrine. In the Globe Machine8 case, a craft union was seeking
to carve out a craft unit from a proposed industrial unit; and
under the Globe Doctrine, employees in the potential craft unit
were given a choice on the ballot for their craft group between the
competing industrial and craft unions. If a majority in the pro-
posed craft unit voted for the craft union, then the separate craft
unit would be certified.
In retrospect, the Globe compromise should have enabled the
NLRB to ride out the storm of controversy rather handily. None-
8. Globe Machine & Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294 (1937).
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theless, it did not satisfy the AFL leadership which continued to
press for automatic unit determinations on a "craft" basis when-
ever they were sought by an AFL union. The AFL unions were
already getting this consideration under the Railway Labor Act
(RLA). In this respect, the NLRA differed from the RLA be-
cause under the NLRA there were no specific criteria for the
Board to apply when determining appropriate units.9 Under the
RLA, bargaining units were to be established specifically on a
"craft or class" basis. It may be that someone in the AFL hierar-
chy saw Leiserson, with his background, as an ideal NLRB ap-
pointee who could be counted on to embrace the "craft or class"
approach because of his NMB experience. In any event, Leiserson
was sold to the White House and joined the NLRB on June 1,
1939.
Billy Leiserson was, above all, a realist. He was an economist
with a pronounced distaste for legalistic maneuvering and manip-
ulation, and he had a long and illustrious background in mediation
and arbitration. Thereby hangs the point of this story. To this day
I vividly recall sitting in Billy Leiserson's NLRB office late in
1939, reviewing with him a case in which it appeared that even
though there was an applicable grievance procedure and binding
arbitration clause in place, charges of discrimination under the
NLRA had been filed by the union. A complaint had been issued
by the Board, a hearing had been held, and a proposed decision
had been drafted for the Board members. All of this was done
without any thought being given to the existing and agreed upon
arbitration procedure. Upon learning this, Leiserson immediately
phoned Chairman Madden to suggest that the Board simply refer
the case back to the parties on the ground that the Board would
not exercise its statutory jurisdiction because the discrimination
claim was arbitrable. Leiserson's recommendation was not em-
braced, for better or for worse, perhaps because it came at such a
late stage in the case. It does not appear, however, that the NLRB
showed any serious disposition to defer to arbitration until
9. Section 9(b) of the NLRA provided:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to insure to employees the
full benefit of their right to self organization and to collective bargaining and
otherwise effectuate the policies of this Act, the unit appropriate for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit,
or subdivision thereof.
National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449, 453 (1935)(codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1986)).
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Spielberg'° was decided sixteen years later. Were Leiserson alive
today he, no doubt, would feel vindicated by Spielberg,1' Col-
lyer,12 and the related NLRB decisions which followed. He was a
prophet before his time.'"
Let us turn now to the NWLB and its role in enhancing the
status of grievance arbitration. Here again, some personal history
may be pertinent. Very early in 1943, when I was NWLB Re-
gional Chairman in Philadelphia, our Board encountered a dispute
case involving a grievance which had arisen during the life of an
agreement between the disputing parties. The United States Con-
ciliation Service had certified the case to our Board for disposi-
tion. By a happy coincidence, William Simkin was sitting with me
as a Vice Chairman on the day the case was presented to our
Board. Most of you, I am sure, are well aware of Bill Simkin's
long and illustrious career as an arbitrator and mediator, includ-
ing his service as Director of the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service (FMCS) in the Kennedy and Johnson Administra-
tions. Early in the hearing Bill said nothing, but quietly thumbed
through the parties' existing agreement. He was immensely
pleased to discover that it included a comprehensive grievance
procedure culminating in arbitration. We then recessed at Bill's
suggestion. In our executive session all Board members quickly
agreed to direct the parties to arbitrate the problem which they
had brought to us, since it clearly involved a dispute which came
under their agreement.
In my experience, the tendency among unions to bring dis-
putes to the NWLB which were arbitrable or should have been
arbitrable was common. This was understandable for a couple of
reasons. The Board was created on. the assumption that strikes
could not be tolerated during World War II, and that an alterna-
tive path to resolution of disputes should be provided by the
NWLB. From a more pragmatic perspective, the NWLB provided
a free service, as well as being tripartite.
This tendency to resort to the NWLB was a potential prob-
10. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
11. Id.
12. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
13. It is an interesting footnote to history that Leiserson appears to have become
more ready than Chairman Madden to embrace an industrial type unit and reject a sepa-
rate craft claim. This is indicated by the fact that in Bendix Products Corp., 15 N.L.R.B.
965, 972 (1939), the majority refused to direct a Globe election for a claimed Pattern
Makers craft unit, and Madden dissented from the majority's ruling.
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lem, and its magnitude first became apparent in Region III at
Roebling Steel. The United Steelworkers (USW) local at Roeb-
ling began to flood our Board with claims of wage rate and incen-
tive earnings inequities. In addition to disputes of this sort, the
parties also began to flood us with mutually agreed-upon requests
for approval of individual rate or incentive adjustments. The en-
tire Roebling wage structure was in a chaotic condition, and
hardly a week passed without a group of such cases being filed.
There being no way for the Regional Board to develop sound deci-
sions in such a morass, the Public Members devised a "show
cause" order directing the parties to come to a hearing and ex-
plain why they should not develop a job classification program in-
stead of flooding the Board with cases claiming wage inequities.
The predictable result, perhaps, was a directive order by our Re-
gional Board reciting that our Board would not process any Roeb-
ling wage inequity claims until the parties had devised and in-
stalled a complete job classification system at a total cost of not
more than two cents per hour worked. This did the job. Of course,
we had no authority to issue such a ukase, but we did so unani-
mously. We had the full concurrence of the Union members of our
Board, including the USW District Director. Ultimately, on No-
vember 25, 1944, the National Board directed all of the major
Basic Steel companies to eliminate inequities.
While the Roebling situation was in ferment, a larger prob-
lem was developing through many of the numerous Basic Steel
plants in Region III.14 At the time, there were no effective arbi-
tration provisions in such plants. In U.S. Steel, for example, indi-
vidual cases could be arbitrated only if both parties so agreed. As
a result, many day-to-day grievances were pouring into Region III
every week. These disputes were heard by Hearing Officers who
could recommend decisions for review and approval of the Re-
gional Board. 15
14. Of eighty-five Steel Industry Companies ultimately involved in the NWLB Di-
rective Order of November 25, 1944, about forty-seven had plants in Region III. See 3
THE TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 1074-76 (1947). Re-
gion III included Pennsylvania, southern New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.
15. This flood may have been generated in good part by the NWLB refusal to estab-
lish a "Steel Panel" to hear all United Steelworkers cases, such as the Automotive Panel
which had been set up in the Detroit Region. All told, the NWLB established 17 special
panels or commissions for various industries and unions. I THE TERMINATION REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR BOARD 17 (1947). In March of 1945, the NWLB finally
established a Steel Commission. Id. The Commission's jurisdiction was limited to "elimina-
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EXTERNAL LEGAL SYSTEM
Here again, our Board resorted to the "show cause" tech-
nique. The USW and major steel companies, where the problem
was acute, were called to a hearing to show cause why they should
not arbitrate disputes under their agreements. The result was a
directive stating that the Regional Board would not entertain such
grievance cases because the parties themselves should use their
own arbitration procedures.
The efforts of our Board to shut down the flood of grievance
cases may have been largely the result of the coincidence that Re-
gion III included so many Basic Steel Plants, and that the wage
structure in most of the steel industry was in a chaotic condition.
Other NWLB Regions, nonetheless, must have experienced some-
what similar problems, at least in terms of the inflow of cases
which actually involved nothing more than interpreting or apply-
ing the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. On July 24,
1943, NWLB Chairman William H. Davis sent a memorandum
to all Regional Board Chairmen noting that where the parties
themselves had not established a grievance procedure culminating
in binding arbitration, the NWLB was "likely to set up such ma-
chinery itself as the [dispute] cases come to the Board." 6 Later
that same year, the NWLB adopted its formal Rules and Regula-
tions, which included a statement that in dispute cases involving
enforcement "of an arbitrator's award on a non-wage issue, the
merits of the award will not be reviewed," and the Board's direc-
tive order in such a case will "direct that the terms and conditions
of employment set forth in the arbitrator's award . . . shall gov-
ern the relations between the parties unless the Board . . .finds
that the award is outside the scope of the reference or submission
to arbitration."' 7 The NWLB policy of encouraging resort to
grievance arbitration ultimately found its fullest expression in the
November 25, 1944 Directive Order in the Basic Steel Industry
Dispute, which required the USW and major steel companies to
establish binding arbitration procedures.
During World War II and in later years, some critics seemed
to assume that the NWLB's promotion of grievance arbitration
tion of intraplant wage rate inequities." 3 THE TERMINATION REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
WAR LABOR BOARD 1078 (1947).
16. Instructions to Regional War Labor Boards: Importance of Grievance Machin-
ery, 9 War Lab. Rep. XXIV, XXIV (1944) (NWLB Memorandum Release issued July
24, 1943).
17. National War Labor Board: Rules of Organization and Procedure, 11 War Lab.
Rep. X, XX-XXI (1944) (section 802.32 issued December 10, 1943).
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was primarily an effort to accommodate organized labor in an
area where there could be no inflationary wage cost impact. Such
a view seems almost ludicrous to one familiar with the vast vol-
ume of disputes which otherwise would have confronted the
Board. 8
Thus, it is my basic thesis today, derived from personal expe-
rience, that the NWLB espousal of grievance arbitration simply
was an eminently practical response to an urgent practical prob-
lem. Exposure to grievance arbitration under the auspices of the
NWLB, nonetheless, made both management and labor receptive
to its use. Shortly after the end of World War II, grievance arbi-
tration was endorsed unanimously by the Executive Committee to
the President's 1945 National Labor-Management Conference.
This Conference was directed by George Taylor and included rep-
resentatives of the United States Chamber of Commerce, the Na-
tional Association of Manufacturers, the AFL, the CIO, the
United Mine Workers (UMW), and the Railway Brotherhoods.
The clear desirability of grievance arbitration was one of the few
items upon which all the committee members could agree, and
their endorsement was accepted by the Conference. 9
The inclusion of Railway Brotherhood representatives in the
1945 Conference inevitably brought grievance arbitration into
sharp focus. In 1934, Congress had embraced grievance arbitra-
tion in the Railway Labor Act (RLA) by requiring parties to util-
ize an arbitration system provided by the Railroad Adjustment
Board. By 1936, the RLA was amended to contemplate "System
Boards" for disputes over the interpretation and application of col-
lective bargaining agreements in the airline industry agreements."0
Finally, Section 203 of the "Taft-Hartley" Act (Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947) affirmatively endorsed the final ad-
justment of disputes over interpretation and application of agree-
ments by an agreed method.2
18. See Friedin & Ulman, Arbitration and the War Labor Board, 58 HARV. L. REV.
309 (1945).
19. See UNITED STATES DEPT. OF LABOR, THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL LABOR-MAN-
AGEMENT CONFERENCE, NOVEMBER 5-30, 1945, at 41-49 (1946)(Division of Labor Stan-
dards Bull. No. 77).
20. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1986).
21. Section 203 of the Act provides: "It shall be the duty of the service, in order to
prevent or minimize interruptions of the free flow of commerce growing out of labor dis-
putes, to assist parties to labor disputes in industries affecting commerce to settle such
disputes through concilliation and mediation." The Labor Management Relations Act of
1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136, 153 (1947)(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1986)).
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The promotion of grievance arbitration by the United States
Congress, the National War Labor Board, and the parties them-
selves ultimately produced full-scale judicial acceptance of arbi-
tration in such landmark United States Supreme Court decisions
as Lincoln Mills,22 the Steelworkers Trilogy,23 Boys Market,24
and Gateway CoaL2 5
Meanwhile, the NLRB at long last began to rely upon griev-
ance arbitration as a means of dealing with its persistent and sub-
stantial backlog problem. In 1955, Billy Leiserson was finally vin-
dicated, at least partially, by the Spielberg Manufacturing Co.
ruling.2 In that case, an arbitrator had ruled upon a grievance,
but the facts indicated that the NRLA may have been violated as
well. The Board held that it would "defer" to the arbitrator's rul-
ing in such a case and allow it to be dispositive of the potential
unfair labor practice issue, where the arbitral proceedings ap-
peared to have been fair and regular, the parties had agreed to be
bound, and the arbitrator's decision was not clearly repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the Act.
Between the years of 1955 and 1984, the NLRB's deferral
policy underwent various changes, a few of which need to be noted
here. In 1971, the Collyer Insulated Wire27 decision marked the
Board's first refusal to proceed with a potential unfair labor prac-
tice case where the dispute had not gone to arbitration, but it ap-
peared that it could have gone to arbitration under the arbitration
procedure agreed upon by the parties. Since Collyer, a substantial
number of cases have been deferred to arbitration in this manner,
particularly those involving claims of discrimination due to union
activity and claims of an illegal refusal to bargain.
In the 1984 decision of Olin Corporation and Oil Chemical
and Atomic Workers,28 the Board carried the Spielberg9 doctrine
further by requiring that a party opposing deferral affirmatively
establish that the Board's standards for deferral had not been met
22. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
23. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
24. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
25. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
26. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
27. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
28. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
29. 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).
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because of defects in the arbitral process or in the award. Indeed,
the Board went so far as to say, "[u]nless the award is 'palpably
wrong,' i.e., unless the arbitrator's decision is not susceptible to an
interpretation consistent with the [NLRA], we will defer."" °
While Olin, in particular, has drawn vigorous criticism,31
some earlier critics even questioned the wisdom of the narrower
Collyer32 policy. Of particular interest here, perhaps, is the com-
ment of David Feller as to Collyer:
I think the Board has a very foolish notion that if a labor dis-
pute arises where there is a collective bargaining agreement
which may involve some question under the collective bargaining
[agreement], the Board should refer the matter to an arbitrator.
I do not think that is particularly exceptional if the Board defers
to an arbitrator to decide what the contract means, that is, to
use that arbitration decision as a datum for the purpose of then
deciding whether or not there is an unfair labor practice. How-
ever, the Board's position, at least up until fairly recently, was
that when a dispute is taken to arbitration, the party that is
claiming a violation of the National Labor Relations Act must
make that claim before the arbitrator, and if that party fails to
do so, he has waived his opportunity, and the Board will not
decide whether or not there has been a violation of the Act. 3
As most of the critics of the NLRB deferral policy empha-
size, there is no assurance that an arbitrator, interpreting or ap-
plying a collective bargaining agreement, will reach a conclusion
which would be consistent with an NLRB ruling applying Section
8(a)(3) or 8(a)(5) of the Act to the same facts. That may be con-
ceded. For my purposes, however, the more pertinent question is
whether the deferral policy is sound from an administrative view-
point, particularly given the policy enunciated in Section 203 of
the 1947 Labor Management Relations Act and the heavy volume
of cases which has plagued the NLRB throughout its life.
As both the NWLB and NLRB experiences demonstrate, co-
gent practical considerations support reliance upon private griev-
ance arbitration as opposed to governmental or administrative in-
tervention into the established collective bargaining relationships.
30. 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984) (footnote omitted).
31. See Gates & Elder, Olin Must Not and Will Not Survive, 38 LAB. LJ. 723
(1987).
32. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
33. Feller, Relationship of the Agreement to External Law, in LABOR ARBITRATOR
DEVELOPMENT 33 (1983).
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One such consideration is the urgent need to deal as efficiently as
possible with an otherwise unmanageable caseload. Equally im-
portant is the need for the parties to develop their own relation-
ship without bureaucratic intervention. There should be no doubt
that similar practical considerations have influenced the key
United States Supreme Court decisions on grievance arbitration
which followed the 1957 Lincoln Mills34 decision.
The courts' involvement in grievance arbitration has been in-
evitable. The fact that numerous federal and state enactments re-
quire arbitration of grievances within specific statutory
frameworks makes it most unlikely that any individual arbitrator
can fail to consider and give due weight to some aspect of external
law for very long. Indeed, it is sometimes the case that the arbi-
trator is forced by the parties to apply external law to the best of
his ability. In most instances, however, neither the parties nor the
law itself imposes such an obligation. Therefore, the arbitrator
may properly conclude that, while some aspect of external law
may be relevant or indirectly involved, the grievance properly
should be dealt with only under the relevant provisions in the par-
ties' agreement. Often the decision on which course to pursue will
be governed by the arbitrator's own background, training, experi-
ence, and confidence.
In my own view there is little useful purpose to be served by
scholarly endeavors to delineate what all arbitrators should or
should not do with respect to interpreting, applying, or rejecting
external law. There are too many variables to permit dogmatism
in this area, but it should be clear that the arbitrator's source of
authority is normally the agreement of the parties.
There remains one major aspect of external law with respect
to grievance arbitration which warrants analysis as part of this
Symposium, and that is the appropriate scope of judicial review of
an arbitration award which has been issued.
Consideration of this topic should begin with the opinion in
Enterprise Wheel.35 Enterprise was a vitally important case in the
Steelworkers Trilogy3" since it addressed the critical issue of to
what extent courts may review and set aside arbitral decisions
34. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
35. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
36. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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which interpreted and applied collective agreements. The impor-
tance of Enterprise Wheel.3 for this purpose cannot be overstated.
Shortly after the Court's Lincoln Mills"8 decision in 1957, Ben
Aaron assessed the potential impact of that decision at the 1959
meeting of the National Academy of Arbitrators."9 He viewed
with grave misgiving the Lincoln Mills"' ruling that under Section
301 of the LMRA of 1947 courts could order resort to arbitration
when arbitration was contemplated in the parties' agreement.
Aaron's concern was that with the courts directly involved in the
arbitration process, there easily could be a return to the unsound
Cutler-Hammer"' doctrine, which had been substantially discred-
ited by 1957. Thus, Aaron cogently stated:
Some of the decisions involving arbitrability, however, are based
on reasoning not dreamt of in any arbitrator's philosophy, and
the list of Horrible Examples grows longer and longer. From
Cutler-Hammer"l to Warrior & Gulf Navigation Company"
the story is the same: Under the guise of determining arbi-
trability, the court disposes of the merits of the case, usually by
finding the relevant language of the collective agreement so
clear in meaning and so ineluctable in effect that, it would seem,
only idiots and arbitrators could profess to see in it a lurking
ambiguity giving rise to an arbitrable issue."'
As Dave Feller pointed out when commenting on Ben
Aaron's 1959 presentation, 45 the Steelworkers Trilogy4" was al-
ready making its way to the U.S. Supreme Court. The subsequent
impact of the Trilogy decisions have been evaluated so thoroughly
over the years since 1960 by commentators, learned or otherwise,
that no further exposition is warranted here beyond noting that
the key significance of the Enterprise Wheel 7 opinion was that
37. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
38. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
39. Aaron, On First Looking Into the Lincoln Mills Decision, 12 PROC. NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. 1 (1959).
40. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
41. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 A.D. 917, 67
N.Y.S.2d 317, affid, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
42. Id.
43. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
44. Aaron, supra note 39, at 8.
45. Feller, supra note 33.
46. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
47. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
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courts were not, by virtue of Section 301, to intrude upon the ar-
bitrator's determination of the merits of any given grievance. The
narrow, permissible limits of judicial review were carefully spelled
out in the opinion of Justice Douglas, which included these cau-
tionary sentences:
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of
the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense
his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for
guidance from many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so
long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement. When the arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to
this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement
of the award.,8
Given the Enterprise opinion, 9 in combination with the other
two Trilogy opinions,50 the fears of many observers that the Lin-
coln Mills51 decision would revive the Cutler-Hammer52 doctrine
were largely defused." In 1983, the Supreme Court restated and
clarified the substance of the Enterprise opinion in Grace v. Rub-
ber Workers:
Under well-established standards for the review of labor arbitra-
tion awards, a federal court may not overrule an arbitrator's de-
cision simply because the court believes its own interpretation of
the contract would be the better one. When the parties include
an arbitration clause in their collective bargaining agreement,
they choose to have disputes concerning constructions of the
contract resolved by an arbitrator. Unless the arbitral decision
does not "dra[w] its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement, a court is bound to enforce the award, and is not
entitled to review the merits of the contract dispute. This re-
mains so even when the basis for the arbitrator's decision may
be ambiguous.""
By the time this case was decided in 1983, the Supreme
48. Id. at 597 (emphasis added).
49. Id.
50. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United Steel-
workers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
51. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
52. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 A.D. 917, 67
N.Y.S.2d 317, affid, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
53. See Morris, Twenty Years of Trilogy: A Celebration, 33 PROC. NAT'L ACAD.
ARB. 331 (1981).
54. W.R. Grace & Co. v. International Union of United Rubber, 461 U.S. 757, 764
(1983)(emphasis added).
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Court had ruled that under Section 301 of the LRMA it was
proper to enjoin a strike and order arbitration where the parties'
agreement included a no-strike pledge and provision for binding
arbitration. This rule emerged from the 1970 Boys Market 5 deci-
sion. In 1974, the Supreme Court reiterated the indication set
forth in its 1962 Lucas Flour decision5 6 that a no-strike commit-
ment could be "implied" by the Court when an agreement pro-
vided for binding arbitration of grievances, so as to warrant en-
joining a strike and directing arbitration."7
Perhaps the most interesting recent Supreme Court decision,
for present purposes, is the Misco case.58 In this case an arbitrator
reinstated an employee who had been charged with possession of
marijuana on the plant premises. The reinstatement was set aside
by a federal district court on the ground that the award was con-
trary to "public policy." The ruling was affirmed by the Fifth Cir-
cuit. The Supreme Court reversed in an opinion by Justice White,
who forcefully delineated the Court's view as to the narrow scope
of judicial review of an award in grievance arbitration. As for
"public policy," White wrote:
In W.R. Grace, we recognized that "a court may not enforce a
collective-bargaining agreement that is contrary to public pol-
icy," and stated that "the question of public policy is ultimately
one for resolution by the courts." We cautioned, however, that a
court's refusal to enforce an arbitrator's interpretation of such
contracts is limited to situations where the contract as inter-
preted would violate "some explicit public policy" that is "well
defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to
the laws and legal precedents and not from general considera-
tions of supposed public interests.'" In W.R. Grace, we identi-
fied two important public policies that were potentially jeopard-
ized by the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract: obedience
to judicial orders and voluntary compliance with Title VII. We
went on to hold that enforcement of the arbitration award in
that case did not compromise either of the two public policies
allegedly threatened by the award. Two points to follow from
our decision in W.R. Grace. First, a court may refuse to enforce
a collective- bargaining agreement when the specific terms con-
tained in that agreement violate public policy. Second, it is ap-
55. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
56. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
57. Teamsters Local v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
58. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
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parent that our decision in that case does not otherwise sanction
a broad judicial power to set aside arbitration awards as against
public policy. Although we discussed the effect of that awdrd on
two broad areas of public policy, our decision turned on our ex-
amination of whether the award created any explicit conflict
with other "laws and legal precedents" rather than an assess-
ment of "general considerations of supposed public interest." At
the very least, an alleged public policy must be properly framed
under the approach set out in W.R. Grace, and the violation of
such a policy must be clearly shown if an award is not to be
enforced.59
Despite the Misco opinion,6 0 judicial assertions of "public
policy" considerations have continued to play a troublesome role
in some federal district and circuit court decisions.61 The most sig-
nificant such case, for present purposes, appears to be S.D. War-
ren Co. v. United Paper Workers 62 This case was one of two com-
panion cases which were first heard by Judge Gene Carter, a
highly regarded judge on the Federal District Court for Maine. In
this case, three employees had been discharged for possession of
marijuana on company premises. They were clearly guilty of the
charge, but the arbitrator reduced the discharges to suspensions of
four, seven, and nine months respectively. In so doing, the arbitra-
tor ruled, on the basis of careful evaluation of extenuating circum-
stances and earlier applications of rules embodied in Mill Rule 7,
that there was not "proper" cause for dicharge but that substan-
tial suspensions were warranted. In the district court, the com-
pany argued to Judge Carter that under the parties' agreement,
possession of marijuana alone was defined as a "proper" cause for
discharge. Judge Carter rejected this argument, but the First Cir-
cuit reversed. 3 Given the subsequent and somewhat remarkable
developments in this case, it is useful to note its salient facts.
Under both the Management and Seniority provisions in the
parties' agreement, it was clear that discharge could be imposed
59. Id. at 373.
60. Id. at 364.
61. See, e.g., Iowa Elec. Light & Power Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987); Professional Adm'rs Ltd. v. Kopper-Glo Fuel, Inc., 819
F.2d 639 (6th Cir. 1987); Local One Amalgamated Lithographers v. Stearns & Beale, 812
F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1987); United States Postal Service v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers,
663 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1987), rev'd, 839 F.2d 146 (3rd Cir. 1988).
62. 632 F. Supp. 463 (D. Me. 1986)(Warren I).
63. S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 815 F.2d 178 (1st Cir.
1987).
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only for proper cause. The company relied on Mill Rule 7(a) in
urging that "possession, use, or sale" of marijuana on Mill prop-
erty automatically established "proper" cause for discharge. Mill
Rule 7, as a whole, is critically important in the circuit court's
opinions. It warrants quotation here:
Mill Rule 7 - Causes for Discharge
In any organization, certain rules of conduct must be observed
by the members for the good of all.
Violation of prescribed rules are cause for disciplinary action
of varying degrees of severity.
Violations of the following rules are considered causes for
discharge.
a) Possession, use or sale on Mill property of intoxicants, mari-
juana, narcotics or other drugs ...
b) Smoking upon Company's premises except in authorized
smoking areas, as provided under "Smoking."
c) Unauthorized destruction or removal of the Company's
property.
d) Refusal to comply with Company rules.
e) Willful disobedience or insubordination.
f) Neglect of duty.
g) Disorderly conduct.
h) Dishonesty.
i) Obvious sleeping on duty.
j) Deliberate waste of Company time and/or material.
k) Leaving the Mill while on duty except by permission of Fore-
man ....
1) Violation of certain rules specifically noted in the Mill Safety
Rules.
m) Incarceration after being sentenced.
n) Giving or taking a bribe of any form to obtain work, retain a
position, or obtain any preferential treatment whatsoever.
The First Circuit reversed Judge Carter's refusal to set aside
the arbitrator's award because, in its view, Carter was wrong both
in ruling that the contract allowed the arbitrator to review the
degree of punishment to be given the employee, and in ruling that
the arbitrator's award did not violate public policy.6 4 On certio-
rari, the United States Supreme Court reversed, and remanded65
the case for further consideration "in light of" the Misco66 case
64. Id. at 180.
65. 108 S. Ct. 497 (1987).
66. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
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which had been decided only thirteen days earlier.
In Misco,6 7 of course, the Court reversed the Fifth Circuit in
a case in which both the federal district court and the Fifth Cir-
cuit had set aside, on the grounds of "public policy," an arbitra-
tor's reinstatement of an employee allegedly in possession of mari-
juana. On the broader subject of the scope of judicial review, the
opinion of Justice White was clear:
Courts thus do not sit to hear claims of factual or legal error
by an arbitrator as an appellate court does in reviewing deci-
sions of lower courts. To resolve disputes about the application
of a collective-bargaining agreement, an arbitrator must find
facts and a court may not reject those findings simply because it
disagrees with them. The same is true of the arbitrator's inter-
pretation of the contract. The arbitrator may not ignore the
plain language of the contract; but the parties having authorized
the arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the agreement,
a court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbi-
trator misread the contract. So, too, where it is contemplated
that the arbitrator will determine remedies for contract viola-
tions that he finds, courts have no authority to disagree with his
honest judgment in that respect. If the courts were free to inter-
vene on these grounds, the speedy resolution of grievances by
private mechanisms would be greatly undermined. 8
At another point, Justice White added, "as long as the arbitrator
is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he
committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his
decision." '69
Despite these cogent observations in Misco,70 when the case
was remanded, the First Circuit again ruled that the arbitrator's
decision to not discharge the employees should be set aside. 1
While recognizing that its earlier public policy pronouncement no
longer could stand following Misco,7 2 the First Circuit proceeded
to develop its own interpretation of the controlling collective-bar-
gaining agreement, and then concluded that the arbitrator had ig-
67. Id.
68. Id. at 370-71.
69. Id. at 371.
70. Id. at 364.
71. S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 845 F.2d 3 (1st Cir.
1988).
72. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
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nored the "plain language" of the agreement. On its face, the
court's opinion unmistakably reflects that the court disagreed with
the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement, and despite the
strictures set forth in Justice White's Misco s opinion, the First
Circuit refused to accept the arbitrator's interpretation.
Obviously, arbitrators have different views regarding the pos-
session or use of illegal drugs in the work place. It may be that
some arbitrators would feel, as the First Circuit court obviously
did, that discharge is the appropriate penalty for such an offense.
Nonetheless, the reasoning of the First Circuit court is astonishing
to one familiar with the realities of collective bargaining. An ex-
perienced negotiator readily would see Mill Rule 7 as an almost
classical example of studied ambiguity. On its face the rule is a
"grab bag." It covers fourteen categories of offenses which range
from the very serious (use or sale of drugs in the plant) to the
potentially trivial (neglect of duty, sleeping, or "waste" of com-
pany time). Obviously, not all of these offenses would be regarded
as cause for automatic discharge without prior resort to corrective
or progressive discipline. At the same time, Mill management un-
doubtedly desired to stress the potential seriousness of violating
plant rules by including in Rule 7 the possibility of discharge.
Hence Rule 7, at the outset, speaks of "causes" for discharge and
says only that violations in any one of the fourteen categories of
offenses are "considered" causes for discharge. There is nothing to
suggest that any single rule violation in any of the fourteen cate-
gories of offenses, in and of itself, invariably would constitute
"proper" cause for discharge. While a typical union bargaining
committee easily could agree to the ambiguous Rule 7 as written,
in recognition of management's need to stress the potential seri-
ousness of rule violations, it hardly would be able, politically, to
agree that any offense in any of the fourteen categories listed
under Mill Rule 7 automatically would constitute proper cause for
discharge.
Against this background, the First Circuit nonetheless con-
cluded that, given Mill Rule 7, "[n]othing is left to the arbitra-
tor's judgment except determining whether the rules are vio-
lated.11 4 Shades of Cutler-Hammer!"5 This judicial overreaching
73. Id.
74. 845 F.2d at 8.
75. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 A.D. 917, 67
N.Y.S.2d 317, aft'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
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nicely illustrates the need for eternal vigilance by the Supreme
Court in assuring sound administration of the federal judicial sys-
tem. Absent any clear federal "public policy," it would seem
likely that this decision will be reversed by the Supreme Court.76
Any other result could only undermine the Court's clear policy of
minimizing resort to the judiciary in an effort to avoid compliance
with an unpalatable arbitral award.
In conclusion, it is my impression that the interaction be-
tween grievance arbitration and external law is generally coopera-
tive. For practical reasons the NWLB, the NLRB, and the courts
supported and advanced the development of grievance arbitration.
This relationship has continued, as evidenced by the strict limits
on judicial review of arbitration decisions which are expected to
remain in place.
76. Ed Note: Since this paper was prepared, the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988,
was embraced by Congress in late 1988. Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-690, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 4181, 4304 (to be codified
at 41 U.S.C. §§ 701-705 & 707).
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